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Register here: SCCS symposium 2026 – Fill out form

This year’s programme features a poster exhibition, and we particularly encourage PhD students to present their research.

• Poster submission deadline: 7th October 2026
• Submission form: SCCS symposium 2026 - call for posters – Fill out form
• Printing support is available upon request.
• A £50 will be awarded for the Best PhD Student Poster (Amazon voucher)!

We are especially excited to welcome Professor Fiona Macpherson (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow and founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience) as our keynote speaker with the talk: “Representation, Naive Realism and Colour Illusion”.

 

2:00 Introduction

Professor Anil Seth, Director, Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science

2:10 15 minute talks from SCCS members, including questions and answers

Dr Lionel Barnett, Research Fellow, Department of Informatics: Functional connectivity analysis at the SCCS – a brief retrospective

Dr Sophie Forster, Reader in Cognitive Neuroscience, School of Psychology: Mind Travel: How attention determines the pathway of inner experience

Dr Marek Pokropski, Visiting Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy: Idealisation and Modelling in Consciousness Science

Jocelyn Rose, PhD student at Brighton and Sussex Medical School: Psychedelic praxis: Embedding trauma-responsive therapy into psychedelic healthcare

3:20 Posters and refreshments

Explore a selection of research posters from SCCS members, and find out which poster is awarded the prize

4:15 Keynote Lecture by Professor Fiona Macpherson: Representation, Naive Realism and Colour Illusion

According to naïve realism, perceptual experience consists in direct awareness of a mind-independent world. One of the theory's main attractions is that it offers a straightforward account of phenomenal character: what it is like to have a perceptual experience is constituted by the very objects and properties perceived, rather than by internal mental representations. In this way, naïve realists promise a naturalistic account of perceptual consciousness.

However, on this account, perceptual experience cannot involve error: one cannot perceptually misrepresent objects as having properties they do not possess. Strictly speaking, then, there can be no perceptual illusions.

Although naïve realists acknowledge purported cases of illusion, they devote considerable effort to explaining them away. I examine five prominent naïve realist strategies for doing so, including appeals to objective appearance properties, and argue that each faces significant difficulties. I conclude that naïve realism should be rejected.

5:00 Networking and drinks

We’ll move to the IDS Bar in the Students’ Union.

We look forward to seeing many of you there and to celebrating the outstanding research within the SCCS.

If you would like to receive more updates about Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science by joining our mailing list, please contact ccs@sussex.ac.uk

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